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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The majority's conclusion that a solidary surety is a prin-
cipal obligor seems unfounded. Solidary debtors need only be
"obliged for the same thing, so that each may be compelled
for the whole. '50 As the earlier jurisprudence realized, this
might be accomplished simply by a waiver of discussion and
division. This result is suggested not only by the literal terms
of article 3045, which equates solidarity with a waiver of
discussion, but also by the location of this article within a
subdivision of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing only with
discussion and division. If the phrase in article 3045 which
alludes to the effect of solidarity were intended to have a
greater effect, it would hardly be expressed as an exception to
an article of such a narrow context. In contrast, the accessory
nature of the surety's contract is reiterated within each sec-
tion of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with extinction of
obligations.5 To deprive a solidary surety of any more than
discussion and division grants no benefit to the creditor that
he cannot obtain by simply requiring the party to contract as
a principal. It interferes unnecessarily in a situation that
might reflect the actual bargain of the parties and allows a
creditor to defeat his own obligation through the use of
equivocal language. The contract of a solidary surety is acces-
sory by its nature and should remain so even though the
surety be solidarily bound. Likewise, he should be benefitted
by all other terms of his suretyship contract that are not
incompatible with solidarity.
Steve G. Durio
ADMIRALTY: COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN COLLISION CASES
A negligently navigated tanker ran aground on a break-
water which the Coast Guard had failed to illuminate prop-
erly. Although determining that the vessel bore 75% of the
blame and the Coast Guard only 25%, the federal district
court applied the century-old rule of equally divided damages
and ordered the Coast Guard to pay half the vessel's dam-
ages. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,' but on
reaches the same result that would occur should one of the parties be recog-
nized as an accessory.
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2091.
51. See, e.g., id. arts 2198, 2205, 2211, 3076, 3060-63.
1. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974).
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certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that all parties in a maritime collision or stranding are liable
for resultant property damage in proportion to each one's
negligence. Damages will be divided equally only when fault
is equal or the relative degrees of negligence are indetermin-
able. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397
(1975).
Dividing damages equally as a means of compensating
injury is a device of ancient origin.2 The Rules of Oleron, a
principal source of English maritime law, preserved the doc-
trine in medieval times. 3 Though the early applications of the
"moiety rule" had little to do with concepts of negligence or
fault,4 by the time of its recognition in England courts applied
the rule only in cases of mutual fault.5
The leading English case is The Woodrop-Sims,6 in which
the court outlined in dictum the four possibilities for judicial
disposition of a collision case. A court might find either no
fault,7 mutual fault, or sole fault on the part of either plaintiff
or defendant,8 but only when both parties were to blame must
the damages be "apportioned between them." The House of
Lords cited the dictum of The Woodrop-Sims approvingly in
Hay v. LeNeve 10 and affirmed equal division of damages by a
Scottish court. The principal justification for the division in
that case was the extreme difficulty of determining the rela-
tive degrees of negligence of the parties; they were "equally
culpable."'" Thus, neither of the principal English cases was
Before affirming, the appellate court noted the Second Circuit's traditional
dissatisfaction with the divided damages rule.
2. Exodus 9:35: "[A]nd if one man's ox hurt another's, that he die; then
they shall sell the live ox and divide the money of it; and the dead ox also
they shall divide."
3. Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and
Maritime Cases, 45 CAL. L. REV. 304, 308 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Staring].
4. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 7 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]. See Staring at 306.
5. Staring at 308.
6. 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (1815).
7. Such a determination would commonly result from a collision caused
by a storm or another vis major. 165 Eng. Rep. at 1423. A similar notion is
expressed in American maritime law by the term "inevitable accident." GIL-
MORE & BLACK at 486. See cases in note 50, infra.
8. In The Woodrop-Sims the judge submitted the question of causation to
the Trinity Masters, who in turn determined that the Woodrop-Sims bore the
entire fault for the collision. 165 Eng. Rep. at 1424.
9. Id. at 1423.
10. 2 Shaw Scotch App. 395 (1824).
11. Id. at 404.
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imperative authority for the equal division of damages in
cases of mutual but unequal fault.
The United States Supreme Court, applying what it found
to be "the well-settled rule in the English admiralty,"
adopted the concept of divided damages in 1854.12 In conjunc-
tion with two subsequent decisions on causation and alloca-
tion of fault, the doctrine of divided damages has governed
American collision litigation ever since. The first of these
decisions established the "Pennsylvania" rule, requiring a
party found guilty of violating a safety regulation to dem-
onstrate that such violation could not have been a cause of
the accident or be held for at least half the total damages, if
not the entire amount.'3 A second doctrine, the "major-
minor" rule, sometimes worked to mitigate the harsh results
caused by equal division of damages in cases of unequal
fault.14 As formulated by the Supreme Court in 1893,15 the
major-minor principle raised a presumption against a party
whose gross negligence was clearly established; merely show-
ing slight negligence on the part of the other party would not
suffice to grant an apportionment of damages. 1 6 When the
12. The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170, 177 (1854).
13. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1874). The rule creates an enormously
heavy burden of proof and explains the much greater importance attached to
statutory violations in maritime collisions than to violations of comparable
statutes in land torts. See, e.g., Esso Standard Oil Co. v. The President
Garfield, 279 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1960); American Export Lines, Inc. v. Dredge
Admiral, 254 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
14. GILMORE & BLACK at 492.
15. The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72 (1893). The substantial justice of
the major-minor doctrine "in cases where the faults are egregiously un-
equal" was recognized much earlier in Ralston v. The State Rights, 20 Fed.
Cas. 210 (No. 11,540) (E.D. Pa. 1836).
16. Modern decisions indicate that the party against whom the major-
minor principle is applied will be required to prove the other's negligence by
"clear and convincing" evidence. United States v. S.S. Soya Atlantic, 330 F.2d
732 (4th Cir. 1964); A/S Skaugaas (I.M. Skaugen) v. T/T P.W. Thirtle, 227 F,
Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Dredge Cartegena v. T/T P.W. Thirtle,
345 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 382 U.S. 918 (1965); Esso Standard Oil
Co. v. Oil Screw Tug Maluco I, 212 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Va. 1963). Analytically,
it has never been clear whether the principle creates a strong presumption
against the grossly negligent vessel or a finding of no fault on the part of the
"minor" offending vessel. One authority observes: "In such cases, the courts
have sometimes announced their intention to resolve all doubts in favor of
the comparatively innocent vessel, shutting their eyes to what might under
other circumstances have been regarded as fault, or have found that, in view
of the grossness of the fault of one vessel, the minor error of the other cannot
be said to be a contributory cause of the disaster." GILMORE & BLACK at 492.
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rule was applied, its operation thus forced a party greatly at
fault to bear all the damages of a collision. But the criteria
for the application of the major-minor principle were "vague
and unreliable"; 17 this problem recurred in the less fre-
quently used doctrines of last clear chance, 18 inevitable acci-
dent, 19 and inscrutable fault.20
The Brussels Convention of 1910 replaced the rule of di-
vided damages with a judicial determination of relative de-
grees of fault.21 Proportional damages thus became the law of
almost every major maritime nation.2 2 Although England
adopted the rule immediately, 23 the United States never rat-
ified the Convention.2 4 The principal opposition arose from
shippers, who feared the effects of the agreement on their
right to indemnity for cargo lost at sea.25
Happily, the question should now be moot. See text at note 46, infra.
17. GILMORE & BLACK at 493.
18. The purpose of this doctrine has been described as "to free a claimant
from the consequences of a rather low degree of negligence in creating a
dangerous situation of which the party whose activity led to the damage was
well aware and which he could easily have overcome." Petition of Kinsman
Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 720 (2d Cir. 1964).
19. GILMORE & BLACK at 486.
20. One court explained the inscrutable fault doctrine in this way: "We
are unable upon the testimony before us to specify any particular fault, to
put our finger upon any act or omission and assert that to it the accident was
attributable. Fault may exist, but we are unable to discover it; it is inscruta-
ble." The Jumna, 149 F. 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1906).
21. The treaty and the convention appear in full at 6 E.C. BENEDICT,
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 39-42 (A. Knauth 7th ed. 1950). See Huger, The
Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at Sea, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928)
[hereinafter cited as Huger].
22. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 404 n.7, the
Court lists the thirty-eight nations which now adhere to the Brussels Con-
vention.
23. MARITIME CONVENTIONs ACT, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 57, § 1 (1911).
24. The only significant attempt at Congressional ratification was made
in the late 1930's. Despite strong support by Secretary of State Hull, the
proposal died in committee. See Comment, The Difficult Quest for a Uniform
Maritime Law: Failure of the Brussels Conventions to Achieve International
Agreement on Collision Liability, Liens, and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J. 878
(1955).
25. The Brussels Convention also contained an agreement on ocean bills
of lading which was based upon the Harter Act, 46 USC §§ 190-95 (1958). Like
the American statute, it denied cargo the right to recover from its carrier for
losses caused by negligent navigation. But the international agreement re-
quired the noncarrying vessel to respond in damages to cargo only in propor-
tion to its fault for the collision. Thus, in every mutual fault collision caused
by negligent navigation, the Brussels Convention would deny cargo recovery
1975]
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Congress's apparent satisfaction with the rule of divided
damages was not matched in all quarters of the judiciary.
Some courts grumbled at being required by precedent to
apply the rule; 26 others simply refused to follow it.27 In 1973,
the Supreme Court intimated that the rule of divided dam-
ages had fallen into disfavor by granting writs to reconsider
it, but the issue was not reached because the Court found sole
fault.28
In the instant case, 29 Justice Stewart began by examining
the policy considerations underlying the anachronistic di-
vided damages rule. The Court had originally adopted the
doctrine in 1854 as the standard "best tending to induce care
and vigilance on both sides. ' 30 Conceding the value of such a
goal, the Court noted that the comparative negligence rule of
the Brussels Convention also punishes wrongdoing, and thus
should have equivalent deterrent effect.3 1 The crucial prob-
lem with the rule of divided damages, though, was not its
ineffectiveness in inducing cautious navigation, but its fre-
quently inequitable results. The Court reasoned that such a
solomonic approach to justice held great potential for unfair-
for the percentage of its damages which could be attributed to the carrier's
fault. American shipping interests had earlier circumvented the effect of the
Harter Act by recovering their entire loss from the noncarrying tortfeasor,
who was allowed to calculate such payments into the total amount of dam-
ages to be divided. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899). The anomalous
result was to render the carrier liable for half the cargo damage in cases of
mutual fault, but to absolve the carrier totally when it admitted sole fault.
See Huger at 545. Reluctance to relinquish this curious advantage explains
in large measure cargo's opposition to American adoption of the Convention.
26. Eastern S.S. Co. v. International Harvester, 189 F.2d 472 (6th Cir.
1951); National Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950)
(L. Hand, J., dissenting); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 157 F.2d 250
(2d Cir. 1940).
27. McKeel v. Schroeder, 215 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1963); N.M. Patterson
& Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1962), reversed 324
F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).
28. Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140 (1973). Significant
developments were apparently expected by the Fourth Circuit, which re-
manded a case with a suggestion that further proceedings be stayed until the
Supreme Court announced its opinion in Reliable. Harbor Towing Corp. v.
S.S. Calmar, 507 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1972).
29. The decision was unanimous.
30. The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170, 178 (1854).
31. United States v. Reliable TransferCo., 421 U.S. 397, 403 (1975).
Though the Court did not delve into the question, it is apparent that the




ness to parties only slightly at fault.32 The potential was
exacerbated by the Pennsylvania rule, which could parlay a
mere technical regulatory violation into an equal share of
enormous liability.33 Likewise, the Court regarded the
major-minor fault doctrine as an ineffective mitigating fac-
tor: not only did its imprecise nature render it "inherently
unreliable," 34 but its operation was equally unfair to the
party beset by it as was the rule of equal division to the
slightly negligent party.3
5
The Court next dealt with objections raised by critics, of
the comparative negligence system. Pointing to the experi-
ence of every other major shipping nation and the history of
American maritime personal injury litigation, the Court de-
nied that determination of comparative degrees of negligence
is prohibitively difficult.36 In response to the suggestion that
equal division of damages promoted out-of-court settlements,
the Court cited statistics demonstrating that over ninety per
cent of suits for maritime personal injuries, based on com-
parative negligence, are settled before trial.37 The Court also
observed that to claim that a legal rule keeps parties out of
32. Id. at 405.
33. Id. at 405-06.
34. Id. at 406.
35. "That a vessel is primarily negligent does not justify its shouldering
all responsibility, nor excuse the slightly negligent vessel from bearing any
liability at all." Id. at -.
36. Id. at -. The Court has established a rule of "pure" comparative
negligence in Reliable. Although the Mary A. Whalen, the tanker owned by
Reliable Transfer, was found to bear 75% of the blame, it was allowed to
collect 25% of its damages from the Coast Guard. The "pure" form of com-
parative negligence has gained much doctrinal support over its two compet-
ing versions, known as the "Wisconsin modified" and the "New Hampshire
modified" rules. The first system denies any recovery to parties whose fault
is greater than 50%, the second bars recovery if the party's fault is 50% or
greater. See, e.g., Wade, Crawford & Ryder, Comparative Fault in Tennessee
Tort Actions: Past, Present, and Future, 41 TENN. L. REV. 423 (1974). There is
no reason to suppose that set-off principles, long applied in collision cases,
will not continue in force. Compare In re Tug Management Corp., 330 F.
Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1971) with United States v. Motor Ship Hoyanger, 265 F.
Supp. 730 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
37. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 n.13 (1975).
The old rule of divided damages offered a positive incentive to a grossly
negligent party to refrain from settling. If that party could avoid application
of the major-minor principle, it might well receive an equal apportionment of
damages rather than its fair share. The uncertain requirements for applica-
tion of the principle made settlements most difficult in such circumstances.
1975]
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court is scant justification, especially when its application
often leads to unjust results. 38 Finally, the Court declined to
wait any longer for Congressional action on the matter. Cit-
ing as an example its creation of a maritime wrongful death
action,39 the Court noted its traditional role as a leader in the
formulation of admiralty remedies. 40
Abrogation of the rule of equal division of damages is
long overdue. By bringing American law into conformity with
that of competing maritime nations, Reliable fulfills a tradi-
tional goal of admiralty policy.4 1 The uniformity should bring
an end to forum-shopping among nations, a previously wide-
spread practice in collision litigation. 42 .
The necessity for more precise determination of degrees
of negligence under a comparative approach should have an
important effect on several of the judicial rules previously
applied in collision cases. The closest question is whether the
Pennsylvania rule survives the decision in Reliable. Argu-
ably, the rule's blunt determination of the existence or ab-
sence of fault is of no aid in measuring comparative degrees
of negligence. Under the old version of divided damages, the
pertinent inquiry was limited to whether a particular vessel
should bear half the loss, the entire loss, or escape liability
altogether. The heavyhanded effect of the Pennsylvania rule
was well suited for such a purpose, but a more finely cali-
brated instrument is needed for measuring comparative de-
grees of negligence. 43 The better view, however, would regard
the Pennsylvania rule as unaffected by Reliable. Its original
purpose was to promote compliance with navigational regula-
tions," and there is no reason to abandon that goal now, with
38. Id.
39. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
40. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975).
41. GILMORE & BLACK at 45.
42. Id. at 529.
43. In Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1975), the
court was required to apply Japanese substantive law in deciding a collision
case. Since Japan subscribes to the Brussels Convention, the question of
application of an alleged Japanese-Pennsylvania rule was governed by Arti-
cle 6 of the agreement, which abolished all legal presumptions of fault. The
court suggested, though, that one of the principal purposes of the Pennsyl-
vania rule is to simplify adjudication under the divided damages rule, and
that it achieved no such simplification when used in conjunction with the
Japanese system of comparative negligence. The opinion thus indicates that
some courts might be inclined to bury the Pennsylvania rule along with
equally divided damages.
44. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 137 (1874).
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streams and channels increasingly crowded. Moreover, the
Pennsylvania rule should be viewed as a presumption of cau-
sation rather than as a device to assess degrees of fault, and
is therefore unrelated to Reliable's change in division of dam-
ages. In fact, the Pennsylvania rule should lead to more
equitable results when coupled with comparative allocation of
damages. The rule should still raise a presumption of fault
against the party found guilty of a statutory violation, but the
court may then apportion damages according to its finding of
degrees of negligence. For instance, requiring the Pennsyl-
vania offender to bear ten per cent of the damages would
serve both to punish statutory violations and to avoid unfair
distribution of damages.
Since parties will now be held only for their relative de-
grees of fault, the decision in Reliable should abrogate those
rules which were developed to protect the slightly negligent
party from bearing an inequitable share of the damages.
Clearly, under this standard the major-minor principle and
the doctrine of last clear chance have lost their utility. The
former has always been regarded as a somewhat unwieldy
escape valve to avoid unfair consequences of the divided
damages rule.45 The new Reliable system of comparative neg-
ligence should not lead to such untoward results and should
therefore not require any equitable assistance. By recogniz-
ing the unfairness of requiring a vessel greatly at fault to pay
the entire damages of a mutual fault collision, the Reliable
opinion strongly implied that the major-minor principle is of
no further use.46
The same considerations indicate that admiralty's last
clear chance rule is no longer viable. Its use has always been
"sparse and uncertain, '47 and, like the major-minor principle,
it was developed as an equitable device to require the party
whose fault is gross to shoulder the entire burden of the
collision and thus save the slightly negligent party from an
equal share of liability. The comparative negligence rule of
Reliable renders such accommodations unnecessary. In fact,
English courts have not applied the last clear chance doctrine
45. See, e.g., Judge Learned Hand's dissent in National Bulk Carriers,
Inc. v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950), in which he charac-
terizes the major-minor doctrine as "a sop to Cerberus."
46. See quote in note 31, supra.
47. GILMORE & BLACK at 494 n.47. See also Board of Comm'rs of the Port
of New Orleans v. M/V Agelos Michael, 390 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. La. 1974), which
questions the very existence of the doctrine of last clear chance in admiralty.
19751
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since that country adopted comparative negligence,4a and
American courts should have no further need for it.
Also unanswered is the effect Reliable will have on the
more rarely invoked rules of inscrutable fault and inevitable
accident. Inscrutable fault exists when the court finds a gen-
eral atmosphere of fault, but is unable to attribute it to either
party; it is akin to Justice Cardozo's "negligence in the air.' 4 9
When a collision occurs despite the cautious navigation of
both vessels, the court terms it an inevitable accident. The
application of either doctrine simply means that neither
party has discharged its burden of proof and neither party
receives any compensation.5 0 Since this amounts to a finding
of no negligence, it is unlikely that Reliable's comparative
negligence will have any effect on either rule. Like the
Pennsylvania rule, neither of these doctrines concerns the
allocation of damages, and they should thus emerge un-
scathed from the decision in Reliable.51
A potentially serious problem is raised by the Court's
decisional language requiring "property damage"5 2 to be
borne according to comparative negligence. Maritime colli-
sions frequently result in personal injuries,53 and sometimes
in death.5 4 Payments of settlements and judgments of such
claims are commonly included in the total amount of damages
to be divided, along with payments by the noncarrying vessel
48. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964);
MARITIME CONVENTIONS ACT, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 57, § 1 (1911).
49. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
50. The Jumna, 149 F. 171 (2d Cir. 1906). See also The Grace Girdler, 74
U.S. 196 (1868).
51. While English and American courts have always dismissed suits
upon a finding of inscrutable fault, nineteenth century continental courts
required a division of damages in such situations. The Worthington and
Davis, 19 F. 836 (E.D. Mich. 1883). Arguably the Reliable mandate to divide
damages equally when it is impossible to determine fairly the comparative
degrees of fault should apply to cases of inscrutable fault, since there is a fine
distinction between concurrent but unassessable negligence and a purported
finding of negligence unattributable to the parties. It is unlikely, though,
that the language of Reliable will be taken to grant recovery to both parties
in factual circumstances which previously barred recovery by either.
52. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
53. E.g., Wayerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372, 597 (1963);
Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson, 398 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1968); Petition of
Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 367 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1966).
54. E.g., Mendez v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 421 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1970);
Carr v. Hermosa Amusement Corp., 137 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied
321 U.S. 764 (1943).
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to shippers for their cargo losses.5 5 There is no apparent
reason why liability for these damages should not be appor-
tioned between the negligent vessels in the same ratio as
liability for property damage. Admittedly, that issue was not
before the Court in Reliable, since no personal injury claims
were involved. The problem is thus one which inheres when
the process of rulemaking is undertaken by the judiciary
rather than by the legislature. Instead of establishing a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme, the Court adjudicates only
those issues properly before it. Hopefully future decisions will
establish that personal injury and death claims are to be
borne by the offending vessels in the same proportion as
property damage.
Bernard S. Johnson
RIGHT To COUNSEL ON APPEAL
AND REVIEW IN LOUISIANA
Federal jurisprudence has established minimal constitu-
tional requirements for providing criminal defendants assis-
tance of counsel in state appellate proceedings. In Douglas v.
California,' the United States Supreme Court relied upon the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment in holding that an indigent defendant has a right
to court-appointed counsel to assist in the first appeal of his
conviction, stating that to hold otherwise would discriminate
between moneyed and indigent defendants in the preparation
of their appeals. 2 Distinguishing the need for counsel on first
55. See discussion and cases in note 25, supra. Cf. Hagan v. Department
of H'ways, 368 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. La. 1973) (lost profits included in damages
to be divided); Savoie v. Apache Towing Co., 282 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. La. 1968)
(payments made for maintenance and cure included in total damages). Cargo
interests should have little quarrel with the rule in Reliable, since it does not
include the Brussels Convention's bar to recovery for the percentage of
damages caused by the carrier's negligence. Cargo's right to recover its
entire loss from the negligent noncarrier should therefore not be affected.
1. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
2. "There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of
counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a pre-
liminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for
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